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ABSTRACT 
Media and network systems capture and store data about electronic activity in new, sometimes 
unprecedented ways; computational systems make for new means of analysis and knowledge 
development. These new forms offer new, powerful tactical tools for investigations of electronic 
malfeasance under traditional legal regulation of state power, particular that of Fourth 
Amendment limitations on police searches and seizures under the U.S. Constitution. But 
autonomy, identity and authenticity concerns with electronic data raise issues of public policy, 
privacy and proper police oversight of civil society. We examine those issues and their 
implications for digital and computational forensics 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Privacy is “the right to be left alone” 
(Brandeis and Warren, 1890). Fundamental 
to that right are restrictions on state power 
to intrude into personal affairs. The hallmark 
is the Fourth Amendment and its limitations 
on domestic police searches and seizures 
under the U.S. Constitution set forth at the 
founding of the Republic more than two 
hundred years ago. Prophetically, Justice 
Brandeis in 1928 warned of progress in 
science that would lead to unimagined 
invasions of personal privacy (Olmstead v. 
United States, 277). 
Restrictions on intrusions into the 
"private" activities of people do not 
necessarily apply to non-content related 
material disclosed to third parties or data 
transfers across borders nor are they limited 
to those set out in the federal constitution. 
National security needs may impact access to 
activities otherwise protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. Statutory protections, federal 
and state, may exceed or refine Fourth 
Amendment protections, such as under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  
The hallmark is that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures. What is reasonable or 
unreasonable may not be easily or 
algorithmically defined for the vast, diverse 
scope of human actions.  It generally permits 
a thorough police search of a person’s home, 
person, papers and effects only where there is 
probable cause that evidence of a crime may 
be found or that person has committed a 
crime. Lesser kinds of intrusions may be 
justified by the lesser standard of objective 
facts supporting reasonable suspicion. And 
the use of data for inferences need meet no 
standard as to make someone a "person of 
interest" in an investigation. 
The growth of massive data sets and 
powerful analytics has led to practical 
changes in the profiling of individuals in 
ways never anticipated.   Ohm notes as to 
access to personal information on one's life, 
"Today's technology poses a constitutional 
puzzle that is different in kind, not just in 
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degree, from the one solved only a few 
decades ago" (Ohm, 2011). Given the 
massive data storage and analytic capabilities 
of systems, traditional police investigative 
conduct and search warrants, with their 
traditional particularity requirements, are 
morphing into what some consider the 
functional equivalent of intrusive general 
warrants of search so hated by the Founders 
of the Republic.  
If a person's data life is engaged in a 
cloud system, then search of that system can 
be a search, analysis and conclusion on an 
entire personal life.  
Similarly, personal electronic devices, 
most commonly a cellular telephone, can hold 
massive amounts of information about one’s 
personal life in ways never before anticipated. 
Connected to other systems, they are the 
data life of their holders. Conversely, some 
argue that vetted computational systems can 
bring greater accuracy and less bias to 
forensic analysis as it extends investigative 
powers (Srihari, 2010). It can even serve to 
support the "digital innocence" of a subject 
wrongfully accused (Fairfield and Luna, 
2014).   
The digital age uses digital facts, 
particularly items such as addressing 
numbers under the Internet Protocol, GPS 
location data and alphanumerical identifiers 
used for authentication and identification in 
online transactions. These artifacts become 
the evidence used for making such 
determinations to search or seize. Given the 
technical issues with evidence preservation 
and examination in electronic storage media, 
search warrants relating to computing 
systems may direct the seizure of computers 
and data collections and removal off-site for 
examination in a computer forensics facility. 
These digital facts include the metadata 
and transactional data associated with 
electronic activity. These may be 
independent of any content of the electronic 
transaction but still sufficient, in direct or 
circumstantial context,  
The combination of these circumstances 
has led to the search of homes and businesses 
and seizure the computers therein based on 
finding a credit card number, e-mail address 
or IP address in system data of contraband 
servers. Little other indicia of the identity or 
authentication of the transaction is needed 
for the issuance of a warrant for search and 
seizure. 
This reliance on simple digital 
identification with minimal authentication 
further corrodes privacy and liberty rights in 
new ways. 
2.  “PROBABLE CAUSE” 
THAT A COMPUTER 
CRIME HAS BEEN 
COMMITTED AND A 
STATE INVASION OF A 
PERSON’S HOME, PERSON 
AND COMPUTERS IS 
JUSTIFIED 
Electronic evidence alone or matched with 
other evidence may indicate a crime and 
additional evidence of that crime. That 
additional evidence, once obtained, can 
correlate the electronic record with other 
actions. This correlation and development 
role is particularly important for remote data 
collected over networks; correlation to other 
evidence is a key function of electronic 
evidence in prosecuting a digital crime 
(Carrier, 2005). Absent special 
circumstances, the search or seizure of a 
person or his effects without consent is illegal 
in the U.S. unless  
 
1) an application under oath is made  
2) before a neutral magistrate that 
3) details facts that establish “probable 
cause” to believe a crime has been 
committed and evidence of that crime 
will be found in the place searched 
and things seized. 
“Probable cause” itself means a "fair 
probability" under a common sense analysis 
that evidence is to be found at the place to 
be searched; this was defined as being less 
that the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard to support other judicial findings 
(Illinois v. Gates, 462). An application for a 
search is to be judged under the "totality of 
the circumstances" presented. Id. 
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With the accumulation of network 
forensic and system data in so many forms, 
as well as the volatility and multiplicity of 
that data, what data is sufficient to say there 
is a fair probability that a particular network 
or system user has contraband or evidence of 
a crime on his or her computer? Once that 
quantum is defined, police power is 
essentially unlimited once that measure is 
met by evidence. 
This sensitivity to constitutional 
principles is most strenuously tested when 
looking at the “heroin of cyberspace,” child 
pornography (Howell, 2004). It is one of the 
most inflammatory misuses of networks; it is 
useful for analysis precisely because it is a 
crime to have it in digital possession 
(Losavio, 2005). 
2.1 The Boundaries of “Fair Probability” 
of Digital Evidence of Crime 
A series of court cases in the United States 
have approved the powerful tactical use of 
electronic data to justify issuance of warrants 
to search and seize computers. These cases 
push the boundaries of the Fourth 
Amendment and notions of identity and 
authentication in digital environments. They 
rely on system-collected data independent of 
actual network transactions of downloading 
or uploading contraband.   
These tools raise issues of law, public 
policy and privacy as to proper police 
oversight of civil society. There is concern 
generally that existing rules fail to properly 
deal with digital evidence (Kerr, 2005). “"In 
the old days, the laws against illegal search 
and seizure were interpreted much more 
strictly," one defense counsel notes, "but as 
this technology develops, the definition of 
probable cause will most likely be expanded”” 
(Silberman, 2002).  
The boundaries of “Fair Probability” of 
the existence of criminal evidence are 
strained by decisions of the U.S. Courts.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held, in essence, that on-line 
membership information describing a 
particular person in a child pornography 
website was sufficient to justify the search 
and seizure of that person’s computer. 
(United States v. Gourde, 440). The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit said "It is 
common sense that an individual who joins 
such a site would more than likely download 
and possess such material" (United States v. 
Martin, 426). 
But the Ninth Circuit’s case, United 
States v. Gourde, had no evidence of network 
activity transferring contraband files to 
Gourde’s computer, either through express 
download/ftp transfer, e-mail or simple http 
transfer via the web browser.  
This case provoked both dissent and 
public concern over the boundaries of 
network-transmitted data and user liability 
(Maclean, 2006).  
2.2 General Principle or Fact Specific – 
The Affidavit for the Search 
Gourde pled guilty to possession of 100 
computer images of child pornography, 
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A, 
but reserved the right to challenge the FBI’s 
seizure of his computer, where the definitive 
evidence of his crime was found. If Gourde 
showed there was no probable cause to 
believe there was evidence of a crime on his 
computer, the seizure and search would have 
been illegal and the evidence found could not 
be used against him; as there was no other 
evidence, his conviction would not stand and 
he would be released. 
What distinguished Gourde’s case from 
others was that there was no direct evidence 
of possession of these illegal images by 
Gourde. Gourde’s "steps to affirmatively 
join" the website, were shown by 
membership data, which included his credit 
card, via a web page showing questionable 
material. 
What was not raised in the affidavit was 
any evidence that Gourde had actually 
downloaded child pornography images or 
that it was Gourde himself that had joined 
the website. 
Similarly, in the Second Circuit’s case 
United States v. Martin, the supporting 
affidavit was deemed sufficient where it 
showed there was evidence “that an e-mail 
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address of a “girls12-16” member was linked 
to Martin's house…”  
Thus identification data with minimal 
authentication may support the issuance of a 
state warrant to search and seize an 
implicated computer system. Yet the Court 
of Appeals did note that 
The internet is not a safe haven for 
illicit conduct. Rather, it is a digital 
community where the zeros and ones 
that translate into visible and audible 
expressions have legal consequences. 
Although we will be diligent to guard 
against unlawful searches and 
seizures, even at the digital divide, 
the internet does not present an 
exception to established principles of 
probable cause. Id., at 89 
This remains the standard relating to 
issuance of search warrants relating to 
activity associated with digital contraband 
and IP address identification (United States 
v. Robinson, United States v. Strausbaugh, 
& United States v. Valley). Indeed, combined 
with the persistence of electronic evidence in 
certain media, the traditional doctrine of 
“staleness,” that old information is unreliable 
as to establish a fair probability that 
evidence might still be in a particular 
location, applies differently to electronic and 
digital evidence; old information too stale to 
support a warrant for physical evidence will 
still support a warrant for digital artifacts 
that may be cast about and persist in their 
related media (United States v. Valley). 
2.3 FISA Warrants 
Similar concerns relate to domestic 
surveillance under orders issues by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
and the FISA court. Transactional metadata 
for international communications fall outside 
of Fourth Amendment and statutory 
protections under U.S. law, but if those lead 
to purely domestic communications where 
metadata and content data are needed then a 
court ordered is needed. The issue is 
determining the quantum of evidence, 
particularly inferences from metadata, that 
support issuance of such orders. A related 
issue is the what should be done with data 
producing non-criminal inferences that still 
may impact the privacy of one’s affairs and 
what, if any, limits should be placed on that 
by statute or common law construction. 
3.  IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
These cases imply an exceptionally low 
standard of electronic evidence in support of 
the power of the search warrant. The ease of 
fabrication of electronic evidence goes far 
beyond what is possible with other media 
and is accomplished through common, non-
technical means (Losavio, 2006). This creates 
a possibility for exceptional abuse through 
the application of police power. Cyber 
extortion using child pornography is a global 
issue (The Straits Times, 2005; The Toronto 
Star, 2003; Wright, 2005). Such standards 
offer opportunities to abuse through planted 
and spoofed evidence without incentive to 
authenticate data or correlate it to other 
evidence of criminal activity. 
On the other hand, the shear poison of 
child pornography may lead the courts and 
justice agencies to treat it differently than 
other criminal activity such that this 
seemingly lesser standard does not apply 
elsewhere. Yet when this material falsity was 
raised in Martin, and other cases, the courts 
relied on system data to validate police 
action. 
Judge Poole’s dissent in Martin accuses 
the court of creating just such an exception; 
the danger is that this exception might 
become the rule. 
Reliance on such minimally authenticated 
digital data has contributed to the expansion 
of “identity theft,” itself both a financial 
crime and a violation of personal privacy 
through the false exploitation of another’s 
good name, credit history and right not to be 
hassled by bill collectors.  Now it may justify 
expansion of state invasions of personal 
privacy. 
Caloyannides notes with digital evidence 
“The potential for a miscarriage of justice is 
vast,” (Caloyannides, 2004). As the U.S. 
Supreme Court observed in a denying 
immunity to government agents for the 
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seizure of computers and their subsequent 
destruction during examination:  
Susan Hallock owned a computer 
software business that she and her 
husband, Richard, operated from 
home. After information about 
Richard Hallock's credit card was 
stolen and used to pay the 
subscription fee for a child pornography 
Web site, agents of the United States 
Customs Service, investigating the 
Web site, traced he payment to 
Richard Hallock's card and got a 
warrant to search the Hallocks' 
residence. With that authority, they 
seized the Hallocks' computer 
equipment, software, and disk drives. 
No criminal charges were ever 
brought, but the Government's 
actions produced a different disaster. 
When the computer equipment was 
returned, several of the disk drives 
were damaged, all of the stored data 
(including trade secrets and account 
files) were lost, and the Hallocks were 
forced out of business (Will v. 
Hallock, 2006).  
But that miscarriage of justice can be far 
worse, with conviction and imprisonment 
based on digital contraband on a computer a 
person may not have had dominion over. An 
appalling example is the Amero case, where a 
substitute seventh-grade teacher was 
convicted of four felonies of exposing minors 
to pornography on the classroom computer 
based on erroneous testimony that 
pornography pop-ups can only be fetched by 
intentionally and deliberately accessing the 
material (Krebs, 2014). After facing up to 40 
years in prison, Ms. Amero was granted a 
new trial based on testimony and analysis by 
computer specialists that refuted that claim 
and found both lapsed firewall, anti-virus and 
spyware protection on the computer and 
various spyware programs; her attorney 
observed 
The lesson from this is: All of us are 
subject to the whims of these 
computers, these great machines that 
all of a sudden can create a criminal 
case against someone like Julie, who 
didn't understand what was going on 
(Fox News, 2007). 
Some of these concerns were presaged in 
the GPS tracking and analytics case of 
United States v. Jones, where several justices 
commented on the change in privacy 
relations that may be created by 
computational. The Supreme Court in United 
States v. Jones required a search warrant to 
justify the placement of an electronic 
tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle, 
holding it constituted a physical trespass 
permitted only upon finding of probable 
cause.  But in that opinion Justice Sonja 
Sotomayor further suggested the need to 
reconsider what privacy means in an era of 
massive third party data collection and 
analysis. (concurring opinion, United States v 
Jones).  Jones dealt with one facet of the 
new data reality, that of the massive and 
inexpensive collection of positional GPS data 
and analytics to quickly produce a profile of 
a subject’s activities. Equally applicable to 
the growing data and analytical power of 
digital forensics, Justice Sotomayor wrote:  
The net result is that …—by making 
available at a relatively low cost such 
a substantial quantum of intimate 
information about any person whom 
the Government, in its unfettered 
discretion, chooses to track—may 
“alter the relationship between citizen 
and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.”  
The Supreme Court directly addressed 
these concerns as to the requirements to 
search massive portable data collections in 
mobile cellular telephones in the 2014 cases 
of Riley v. California and United States v. 
Wurie, where it held illegal the warrantless 
search of a cellular telephone seized from an 
arrestee, distinguishing a cell phone search 
from a traditional search incident to an 
arrest.   
The touchstone of the analysis by the 
Supreme Court was this balancing of 
interests “by assessing, on the one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental 
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interests.”(citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U. S. 295, 300 (1999)). In declining to apply 
prior precedent that upheld a search of items 
found on a person incident to their arrest, 
the Supreme Court found that cell phone 
technology, including its uniquely personal 
and massive data profile, did not present any 
risk of the destruction of evidence or danger 
to an officer that outweighed the privacy 
interests of the phone’s owner that were 
enlarged from other personal artifacts by the 
nature of the vast data storage. Thus a 
search of a cell phone by police is 
unreasonable absent a warrant based upon 
probable cause that the cell phone held 
evidence of a crime or was itself an 
instrumentality of a crime.  
Similarly, the limits, if any, to electronic 
surveillance by the National Security Agency, 
may be subject to Supreme Court analysis. 
These will further define digital and 
computational forensic practice and the 
privacy of people within this domain. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
We now live in a new space of information 
density, one where relatively inexpensive 
technologies can give every government the 
surveillance powers possessed by the old 
German Democratic Republic’s Stasi and the 
current regime of North Korea. This may 
have an impact on how people relate to each 
other and to how we are governed.  
In the United States, the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States limits the power of police to 
search and seize a person, his computer and 
related transaction/content data: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be 
seized. IV Amend. (1791) 
Technical security cannot protect privacy 
and security with such attitudes towards 
data.  Security policy must extend into all 
domains of society. The challenge will be to 
establish a balance where courts set a stricter 
boundary for state searches and seizures 
based on electronic evidence of questionable 
reliability. 
The Gourde court observed 
… Given the current environment of 
increasing government surveillance 
and the long memories of computers, 
we must not let the nature of the 
alleged crime, child pornography, 
skew our analysis or make us "lax" in 
our duty to guard the privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
We are acutely aware that the digital 
universe poses particular challenges 
with respect to the Fourth 
Amendment.  
The Supreme Court in United States v. 
Jones and Riley v. California established 
bounds for those challenges, albeit within the 
traditions of our Constitution. That 
awareness still needs greater knowledge of 
the facts of identity and authenticity of 
electronic data as evidence, its mutability 
and evanescence, if the rights and liberties 
and privacy of citizens are to be honored. 
That may be further developed with rulings 
on the limits that may be placed on FISA 
surveillance of the lives of the many (Hurley, 
2014). 
The future regulation of the 
informational lives of everyone will shape 
how the relationships between citizen and 
government evolve.   
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